We show that strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information that may end in one of three possible ways can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
INTRODUCTION
During the pioneering time of game-theoretic research in the first half of the past century, it was proved that the game of chess has a value, i.e., that either there is a winning strategy for White, or there is a winning strategy for Black, or both players can secure themselves a draw. Since then, a rich theory has developed for general games of perfect information, 2 yet surprisingly little is implied by this theory for specific games such as chess; e.g., the question as to which of the three possible values of chess is the actual value continues to be unsettled.
In this paper we show that chess-like games, i.e., strictly competitive, finite games of perfect information with at most three outcomes, can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies in the strategic form. In plain words, our result says that these games (one of which is chess) have the following property. Consider the strategic form of the game. Eliminate all dominated strategies from the strategy sets of each player. Repeat this procedure once. Then the remaining strategy profiles all induce the same outcome, which corresponds to the value of the game.
An analogous result for games with at most two outcomes is easily established: Fix any strictly competitive, finite game of perfect information with at most two outcomes.
3 Then, by the minmax theorem, one of the players, say player i, has a winning strategy. Clearly, this strategy dominates all of player i's non-winning strategies, so that a single round of elimination reduces the strategy set of player i to the set of winning strategies. Thus, any strictly competitive, finite game of perfect information with at most two outcomes is dominance solvable in (at most) one step.
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
We consider any finite, strictly competitive game G of perfect information with at most three outcomes. 4 Formally, let
where X is a finite set of nodes, x 0 ∈ X is the initial node, α X\ x 0 → X is the anterior node function, and if Z = X\α X denotes the set of terminal nodes, 5 then ι X\Z → 1 2 denotes the player function, and ω = ω 1 ω 2 Z → 1 −1 0 0 −1 1 denotes the outcome function. For a given pair of nodes x x we say that x precedes x when there is an H ≥ 0 and a sequence x = x 0 x 1 x H = x such that α x h = x h−1 for h = 1 H. Let X x denote the set of nodes preceded by x. Note that by definition, x is contained in X x . We require that x 0 precedes any x ∈ X. Let x 1 be any node. The subgame rooted in x 1 is defined by
where α 1 = α X x 1 \Z 1 and Z 1 = X x 1 \α 1 X x 1 . 6 For any non-terminal node x ∈ X\Z, let A x = y ∈ X α y = x be the set of actions available at node x. By an action profile we mean a tuple s = a x x∈X\Z , where a x ∈ A x . The terminal node z s ∈ Z determined by s is characterized by the property that there exists a sequence
x H the path p s leading to z s If, for a given node x and an action profile s, we have
H , then we will say that s reaches G x (or simply x). A finite two-person game in normal form is a quadruple
where S i is player i's (finite) strategy set and u i S 1 × S 2 → is player i's utility function. The strategic form of the perfect information game G is the normal-form game N G = S 1 S 2 u 1 u 2 , with strategy sets
and utility functions given by u i s = ω i z s 1 s 2 , for i = 1 2. 7 A strategy s i is dominated by another strategy s i , if u i s i s j ≤ u i s i s j for all s j and there exists an s j such that u i s i s j < u i s i s j .
8 Strategy s i is said to be dominated (without qualification) if it is dominated by some other strategy.
9
Let N = S 1 S 2 u 1 u 2 be a finite two-person game in normal form. Then the game resulting from N by elimination of dominated strategies is defined as
whereS i is the set of strategies for player i that are not dominated in
We will say that D k N results from k-fold elimination of dominated strategies. A normal-form game N is called dominance solvable 10 in at most k steps if the utility functions in D k N are constant. Note that if N is dominance solvable in at most k steps then, for any K ≥ k, D k N = D K N and N is dominance solvable in at most K steps. The value of a normal-form game N for player i is
For a node x in a perfect information game G, we will write
for the value of the subgame rooted in x to player i. A strategy s i ∈ S i is a maximin strategy if s i ∈ arg max˜s i ∈S i min s j ∈S j u i s i s j . We denote the set of maximin strategies for player i in N by M i N . For future 7 The strategic form is non-reduced in the sense that it may contain equivalent strategies, i.e., strategies s i and s i such that u 1 s i ≡ u 1 s i and u 2 s i ≡ u 2 s i 8 As usual, j ∈ 1 2 , and j = i Note that we abuse notation by changing the order of the arguments of the utility functions when i = 2.
9 For a discussion of the form of dominance used here, see Börgers (1993) . 10 The notion of a "dominance solvable" game was introduced by Moulin (1979) . See also Moulin (1986 Proof. By the minmax theorem, either one of the players has a winning strategy 11 (Case A), or each of them can enforce a draw (Case B).
Case A. Without loss of generality, assume that player 1 has a winning strategy, i.e., v 1 N = 1. Then, by definition, a strategy s 1 is a maximin strategy for player 1 if and only if
Therefore, a strategy of player 1 is dominated (by s 1 ) if and only if it is not a maximin strategy. Consequently, player 1's strategy set in D N is M 1 N . From (1) we see that the utility functions for both players are constant in D N and hence that N is dominance solvable in (at most) one step. This proves the theorem for v i N = ±1
Case B. Let now v 1 N = v 2 N = 0 Assume that u 1 s 1 s 2 = −1 for some strategy profile s 1 s 2 , where both s 1 and s 2 are undominated in N. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that s 1 is dominated in D N . By assumption, N = N G for some finite game G of perfect information. Consider the path p s = x 0 x 1 x H associated with the action profile s = s 1 s 2 . By assumption, v 1 x 0 = 0 and v 1 x H = −1. Let x h * be the first node (i.e., with lowest index) on the path p s with non-zero value of the subgame rooted in x h * .
We will show that v 1 x h * = −1. This is clear if h * = H. Therefore let h * < H. To provoke a contradiction assume that v 1 x h * = 1. Consider the alternative strategys 1 ∈ S 1 which is equal to s 1 at all nodes x ∈ X\X x h * , i.e., outside of the subgame rooted in x h * , and which is equal to some winning strategy in G x h * . We show thats 1 dominates s 1 in N. Clearly, u 1 s 1 s 2 ≥ u 1 s 1 s 2 for alls 2 ∈ S 2 (this holds obviously for alls 2 such that s 1 s 2 reaches x h * , and with equality for alls 2 such that s 1 s 2 does not reach x h * ). Moreover, as s 1 s 2 reaches x h * , u 1 s 1 s 2 = 1 > −1 = u 1 s 1 s 2 so that s 1 is dominated bys 1 in N, thereby contradicting the assumption that s 1 is a strategy in D N .
We have shown that v 1 x h * = −1, and we know from the definition of h * that v 1 x h * −1 = 0. Hence, by the minmax theorem, player 2 has a winning strategy in the subgame rooted in x h * , yet no winning strategy in the subgame rooted in x h * −1 . Consequently, at node x h * −1 , it must be player 1's turn.
We are still on our way to prove that s 1 is dominated in the reduced game D N . Consider the alternative strategy s 1 ∈ S 1 that is equal to s 1 outside of the subgame G x h * −1 , and that is equal to some maximin strategy (guaranteeing player 1 a utility of 0) in G x h * −1 . We will show that s 1 dominates s 1 in D N .
We prove first that s 1 is at least as good as s 1 against any strategy s 2 available in D N for player 2. Assume to the contrary that there is some strategy s 2 in D N such that
Then the node x h * −1 is reached by both the profiles s 1 s 2 and s 1 s 2 . (If none of the two profiles reached the subgame G x h * −1 , then utility levels could not differ. Moreover, since s 1 and s 1 are equal outside of G x h * −1 , one profile reaches the subgame if and only if the other does so.) Thus, as s 1 induces a maximin strategy in G x h * −1 , and as v 1 x h * −1 = 0, we get u 1 s 1 s 2 ≥ 0. From (2), it follows that u 1 s 1 s 2 = 1. Now, the profile s 1 s 2 reaches even the node x h * . (The profile s 1 s 2 reaches x h * −1 , and at the node x h * −1 player 1 is called to play, as was shown previously.) We show that in this case, s 2 is dominated in N. Consider the alternative strategy s 2 ∈ S 2 which is equal to s 2 outside of the subgame G x h * and is equal to some winning strategy in G x h * . (Recall that v 2 x h * = 1 ) The strategy s 2 is at least as good as s 2 for all possible strategies for player 1 (by an argument similar to the one used above to show thats 1 dominates s 1 ), and strictly better against s 1 since u 2 s 1 s 2 = −u 1 s 1 s 2 = −1 < 1 = u 1 s 1 s 2 (Note that s 1 s 2 reaches G x h * , since s 1 s 2 is equal to s 1 s 2 outside of the subgame G x h * .) Hence, s 2 is dominated in N, and therefore there does not exist a strategy s 2 in D N satisfying (2).
We show now that s 1 is sometimes strictly better than s 1 in D N This is the case when player 2 chooses s 2 . To see this note first that s 1 s 2 reaches FIG. 1. A strictly competitive game with three outcomes in which no strategy is dominated. the subgame G x h * −1 . (This is so because s 1 s 2 is equal to s 1 s 2 outside of G x h * , hence a fortiori outside of G x h * −1 ) Hence, as v 1 x h * −1 = 0,
In sum, this shows that s 1 is dominated in D N by s 1 , and concludes the analysis of Case B, so that the theorem is proved.
The proof makes extensive use of the perfect-information assumption. Once this assumption is dropped, the result ceases to hold. To see this, consider the normal-form game N 1 depicted in Fig. 1 . This game satisfies all assumptions of Theorem 1 except that it is of imperfect information. And, there is no dominated strategy in N 1 .
CONCLUSION
We have shown that chess-like games can be solved by applying only two rounds of elimination of dominated strategies.
12
Our result raises the following, as we find, puzzling issue. The standard way for determining the value of a finite zero-sum game of perfect information is by backward reasoning-beginning with the decisions to be made at the end of the game, and ending with the decisions to be made at the beginning of the game. In terms of rationality, this seems to require that players hold mutual beliefs (or knowledge) of rationality (in the sense that "White believes that Black believes that White believes and so on") of a degree equal to the (potentially huge!) maximal number of moves of the game. 13 In contrast, when players determine the value of the extensive-form game by iterated dominance in the strategic form, then the necessary level of mutual beliefs of rationality seems to be only two! 14 We conjecture that the following more general statement is true: Any strictly competitive, finite game of perfect information with n outcomes can be solved by applying n − 1 rounds of elimination of dominated strategies. 15 
